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III. ARGUMENT 
A. MRS. BAKER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS WAS NOT RELIED UPON OR 
BRIEFED BELOW, HAS NO SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, AND 
MUST BE REJECTED. 
Mrs. Baker first asserts that this Court need not address whether she is bound by 
the Arbitration Agreement because the "Arbitration Agreement does not comply with the 
mandatory provisions of the Utah statute relating to arbitration agreements between a 
patient and health care provider." Appellee Brief at 4. This argument, however, is not 
properly before the Court because this issue was never raised with the trial court and no 
findings in this regard were made. The Court should refuse to address this argument. 
Although this Court "may affirm the judgment [of a lower court] on any ground, 
even one not relied upon by the trial court," White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 
(Utah 1994), "any rationale for affirming a decision must find support in the record," 
Hillv. Seattle First Nat'lBank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). Moreover, "[t]his Court 
will not consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the trial court and 
concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact 
or law." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am, Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 657 (Utah 
1988) (citations omitted). 
Here, Mrs. Baker asserts for the first time that the Arbitration Agreement fails to 
comply with the arbitration statute. This issue, however, was never raised with trial court, 
never briefed before the trial court, and finds no support in the record. Mrs. Baker 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appears to argue that Dr. Rosenthal failed to affirmatively set forth evidence of a valid 
and binding Arbitration Agreement and that "[i]t is unlikely that defendants could have 
presented the necessary evidence" that Dr. Rosenthal verbally explained the arbitration 
provisions to Mr. Baker because it is not noted in the Arbitration Agreement. Appellee 
Brief at 5. Mrs. Baker sets forth the exact problem this Court has found with making 
such an argument for the first time on appeal: there is no evidence in the record 
supporting her argument and the trial court has never had an opportunity to make any 
findings of fact or law in this regard. 
Mrs. Baker had sufficient opportunity in the court below to dispute the validity of 
the Arbitration Agreement and failed to set forth any evidence that would raise any issue 
as to validity. In Dr. Rosenthal's Memorandum Supporting His Motion to Stay and 
Compel Arbitration, Dr. Rosenthal asserted as a material and undisputed fact that 
Mr. Baker and Dr. Rosenthal signed and were bound by the Arbitration Agreement. 
(R. 18). In her opposition memorandum, Mrs. Baker did not dispute any facts set forth in 
Dr. Rosenthal's memorandum but only argued that the Arbitration Agreement did not 
apply to her. (R. 37-40). Because Mrs. Baker failed to controvert the fact that Mr. Baker 
and Dr. Rosenthal had signed the Arbitration Agreement and that it was valid, such facts 
are deemed admitted. See Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Fennell v. 
Green, 2003 UT App 291, f7, 77 P.3d 339 (applying Rule 4-501 (2)(B), Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration, predecessor to Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
2 
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Rule 7(c)(3)(A) controls the contents of a memorandum supporting a motion for 
summary judgment. Although this matter involves a motion to compel arbitration,, the 
rules concerning a summary judgment motion apply because it likewise requires the 
parties to submit a statement of undisputed facts to the trial court that form the basis for 
the motion. Rule 7(c)(3)(A) provides as follows: 
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment 
shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the 
moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact 
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless controverted by the responding 
party. 
(Emphasis added). Thus, because Mrs. Baker failed to oppose any of Dr. Rosenthal's 
facts, it remains undisputed that the Arbitration Agreement is valid and cannot be 
challenged for the first time on appeal. 
B. WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMANTS ARE BOUND BY CERTAIN 
ACTIONS BY THE DECEASED, INCLUDING THE EXECUTION 
OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. 
i. Appellees Wrongfully Assert that the Heirs' Wrongful 
Death Claim Is Not Affected by the Decedent's Actions* 
Appellees assert in their brief that Mrs. Baker's wrongful death cause of action is 
not subject to Mr. Baker's Arbitration Agreement because such claims are separate and 
distinct from any action Mr. Baker could have brought had he survived. Appellees cite 
the most relevant case in this regard, Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1997), but fail to address the most compelling similarity: that a decedent's actions while 
alive can and do affect the heirs' ability to bring a wrongful death action upon the death 
of the decedent. 
Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that release agreements signed by a 
decedent are binding upon the heirs of the deceased. See Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 
905 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In Russ, the Court ruled that a hold harmless 
agreement signed by the decedent was clear and unequivocal and prevented her heir from 
bringing wrongful death and negligence claims. Id. The present Arbitration Agreement 
is similarly clear and unequivocal, and therefore binding on Mr. Baker's heirs. Unlike 
hold harmless agreements, however, an arbitration agreement does not preclude the heir's 
claims from being brought, it merely designates the forum for those claims. 
In Jensen, the decedent's guardian allowed the statute of limitations to run before 
the decedent died. Jensen, 944 P.2d at 335. Although the decedent died of complications 
resulting from the complained of medical care, her legal guardian surrendered her heirs' 
separate and distinct cause of action for wrongful death by failing to sue for personal 
injury within the applicable statute of limitations. Said the Court: 
The majority of states refuses to allow a decedent's heirs to 
proceed with a wrongful death suit after the decedent has 
settled his or her personal injury case or won or lost a 
judgment before dying. [W]e see no reason to impose a 
different rule regarding the heirs' maintenance of a wrongful 
death suit where an injured patient has chosen to let the 
statute of limitations run on the underlying personal injury 
claim rather than settling or litigating the claim. 
Id. 
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Just as the legal guardian chose not to pursue a personal injury claim in Jensen, 
Mr. Baker chose to sign the Arbitration Agreement. In both cases, the legal 
representative elected to deal with a potential claim in a specific manner. In both cases 
this choice was exercised prior to the decedent's death and a potential wrongful death 
claim. The sole distinction between the cases is that the legal guardian in Jensen chose 
not to file suit whereas Mr. Baker chose to pursue redress through arbitration. The Court 
should decline to adopt a rule that would negate Mr. Baker's right to personal 
determination and defer to his judgment like it deferred to the judgment of the legal 
guardian in Jensen. 
The heirs should not be allowed to alter the legal decisions of the decedent. In 
Jensen, the Court gave great deference to decisions made by the injured party in pursuing 
a claim. It reasoned: 
The rationale underlying the rule barring the heirs from 
bringing a wrongful death suit after the injured patient has 
brought suit on the underlying personal injury action is that 
"the injured individual is not merely a conduit for the support 
of others, he is master of his own claim and he may settle the 
case or win or lose a judgment on his own injury even though 
others may be dependent upon him." W. Page Keeton, et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 955 (5th ed. 
1984). 
Id. If the heirs' are barred from pursuing a wrongful death claim where the injured 
patient has elected to sue, they should also be barred where the injured patient has 
contracted to arbitrate rather than sue. Mr. Baker was master of his claim when he 
elected to arbitrate if certain events occurred. This Court should uphold his actions. 
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ii. Hull v. Silver Does Not Stand for the Proposition that 
Defendants Cannot Raise the Decedent's Arbitration 
Agreement as a Defense to the Heirs' Claim. 
Amicus curiae UTLA relies on Hull v. Silver, 577 P.2d 103 (Utah 1978), for the 
proposition that a mechanical categorization is all that Utah courts require when 
determining whether a defense available against a decedent is also available against his 
heirs in a wrongful death action. In its analysis, UTLA misquotes and misinterprets Hull 
and appears to discount this Court's decisions in both Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 
P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989) and Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). 
UTLA cites Hull for its proposition that the only defenses applicable in a wrongful 
death action are those that are "based upon [1] personal disability to sue, as distinguished 
from defenses [2-a] which inhere in the tort, or [2-b] which are based upon decedent's 
course of conduct after the injury and before death." UTLA Brief at 25 (quoting Hull, 
577 P.2d at 105 (quoting Johnson v. Ottomeier, 275 P.2d 723 (Wash. 1954)). The Hull 
court, however, cited the above language from the Washington courts in a dicta "rejoinder 
to the dissent[ing]" Justice Hall. The Hull majority had already set forth the framework 
for its own analysis concerning whether a wrongful death action between a husband and 
wife is subject to the defense of interspousal tort immunity and this analysis did not 
include the mechanical distinctions between different defenses that the Washington court 
made and on which UTLA relies. 
The Hull majority and dissent, like the Kelson and Jensen courts that followed and 
the court in Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., that preceded, established a framework 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for analyzing defenses available against heirs in wrongful death claims. This framework 
includes (1) analysis of the specific language of the wrongful death act, (2) analysis of the 
statute and/or common law history of the defense at issue, and (3) an analysis of the 
public policy and rationale underlying the alleged defense. 
The Van Wagoner court determined that contributory negligence principles were 
applicable against the heirs of the deceased in a wrongful death action. The court first set 
forth the foundation for the defense and its application in wrongful death actions. 
Significantly, the court found that 
the right of action running to the appellants in this case is 
founded on the same unlawful acts of the defendant, but the 
loss and damages suffered by theme arise out of the death of 
the deceased. The legislature has thus said the right of action 
vests in the heirs-at-law if death ensues but it does not say 
the rights of the third parties [(the heirs)] are modified, 
altered, or changed. 
Van Wagoner, 186 P.2d at 303 (emphasis added). Moreover, the court found that "the 
legislature did not intend to change the rules of substantive law and deny to litigants the 
right to defend on the ground of contributory negligence." Id. 
Here, Van Wagoner instructs that there has never been any intent by the legislature 
or found elsewhere that the heirs' right to bring a wrongful death claim is somehow a 
modified, altered, or changed claim that is immune to the defenses available against the 
deceased. Indeed, the Van Wagoner court found the opposite: that there is no evidence 
that the legislature intended to change the substantive law in Utah, including the viability 
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and applicability of arbitration agreements signed by a decedent and the parties' right to 
defend and pursue claims according to arbitration agreements. 
In addressing the interspousal tort immunity in a wrongful death claim between 
husband and wife, the Hull court first addressed the public policy issues underlying this 
doctrine. The court found that its purpose was to "protect family solidarity" and that in a 
wrongful death action there is "no marital harmony that needs protection, and there is no 
possibility of collusion." Hull, 577 P.2d at 103. After the court disposed of the 
underlying rationale for the defense, the court turned to the specific language of the 
wrongful death act and the interpretation of the statute by the Van Wagoner court. Once 
the Hull court determined that no valid rationale existed for the interspousal defense as 
between a deceased husband and wife, the court quickly disposed of the defense without 
further analysis, concluding that "[t]he action is not derivative" and thus not subject to the 
defense. Id. at 104. The balance of the Hull decision is a dicta response to the dissenting 
Justice Hall and includes a recitation of the history of the wrongful death act, Utah cases 
interpreting each iteration of the act, and citation to and quotation from cases from other 
jurisdictions without expressing any intent to adopt their reasoning or analysis. It is upon 
this dicta portion of the Hull decision that UTLA misplaces its reliance. 
UTLA misquotes the Hull decision by attributing an argument made in Johnson v. 
Ottomeier, 275 P.2d 723 (Wash. 1954) to the heirs involved in Hull: "[Hull's] estate 
argued that inasmuch as: 'a wife cannot sue her husband . . . " UTLA Brief at 25 (balance 
of long quote omitted). UTLA then attributes the Johnson court's rejection of the 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
argument made in that case to the Hull court: "Significantly, however, the Hull Court 
rejected this demand, holding that: 'this exclusionary rule had no application " 
UTLA Brief at 25 (balance of long quote omitted). The Hull court recites the Johnson 
decision as supportive of its decision, however, the court never adopts the analysis or 
analytical framework used by the Johnson court. Indeed, the Hull court itself never 
applied the analysis used by the Johnson court that is mistakenly relied upon by UTLA in 
their brief. UTLA's argument that the only defenses available in a wrongful death action 
are those that can be neatly categorized as those "defenses [2-a] which inhere in the tort, 
or [2-b] which are based upon decedent's course of conduct after the injury and before 
death" is not based on Utah law and should be rejected. 
The Hull decision is instructive, however, as to the proper analysis required here, 
including the necessity of understanding the rationale underlying medical malpractice 
claims, patient-physician relationships, and arbitration agreements. Dr. Rosenthal, 
Dr. Stevens, and the Utah Medical Association have already adequately briefed the 
rationale and policies at issue and to avoid repetition this information is not repeated here. 
See Brief of Dr. Stevens at 20-23; Brief of Utah Medical Association at 6-10 and 17-20; 
Brief of Dr. Rosenthal at 18-19. 
Finally, Appellees assert that the statute of limitations defense applicable to the 
heirs in Jensen is an inappropriate analogy here because there the defense was based on 
actions by the decedent following her injury and before her death. Indeed, their argument 
is that unless the alleged defense is one which "inhere[s] in the tort, or which [is] based 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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upon decedent's course of conduct after the injury and before death," it should not be 
applied against the heirs. UTLA Brief at 25 (quoting Hull, 577 P.2d at 105 (quoting 
Johnson v. Ottomeier, 275 P.2d 723 (Wash. 1954)). The broad exclusion of all defenses 
not fitting this prescription is not warranted and not supported by this Court's holdings in 
Van Wagoner, Kelson, Jensen, or even Hull. How or when a defense arises is not 
material to whether it is applicable against the decedent's heirs; that question is answered 
according to the analysis and principles set forth by this Court in Van Wagoner, Hull, 
Kelson, and Jensen, not by resort to a system from another state that requires no critical 
analysis. 
iii. Appellees Are Bound to the Terms of the Arbitration Agreement 
as Third-Party Beneficiaries. 
Appellees assert that third-party beneficiary concepts do not apply to them as heirs 
because they did not sign the Arbitration Agreement. Specifically, Appellees claim that 
they have not attempted to enforce the Arbitration Agreement and receive no benefit from 
the agreement, but only harm. Appellees' arguments are unavailing. 
Appellees may not have signed the Arbitration Agreement, however, they fail to 
recognize that they could make no claim for loss against Dr. Rosenthal if they were as 
removed from the physician-patient relationship established between Mr. Baker and Dr. 
Rosenthal as they claim. Indeed, by asserting claims against Dr. Rosenthal, the heirs must 
step into the shoes of Mr. Baker and assert the existence of the very physician-patient 
relationship- which includes the Arbitration Agreement- they wish to avoid here. 
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Appellees further assert that because they have not attempted to enforce the 
Arbitration Agreement, the agreement cannot be enforced against them as third-party 
beneficiaries. The heirs fail to recognize, however, that the Arbitration Agreement was 
part of the physician-patient relationship on which the heirs claims for wrongful death are 
necessarily based. The heirs' wrongful death claim, therefore, is precisely an attempt to 
enforce their rights as beneficiaries of Mr. Baker's relationship with Dr. Rosenthal and 
that enforcement action necessarily carries with it the obligation to arbitrate that claim. 
Appellees and UTLA also object to this Court relying upon Allen v. Pacheco, 71 
P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003) and assert that the cases relied upon in Allen are inapplicable here. 
In Parker v. Center for Creative Leadership, 15 P.3d 297, 298 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000), the 
Colorado court found that the "plaintiff may not, while seeking to enforce CCL's duties 
and obligations under the agreement, at the same time argue that the provisions of that 
contract do not apply to him." Contrary to Appellees' assertion, this case is applicable 
here because "[Mr. Baker's heirs] may not, while seeking to enforce [Dr. Rosenthal's 
duties and obligations [to Mr. Baker], at the same time argue that the provisions of [the 
Arbitration Agreement between Mr. Baker and Dr. Rosenthal] do not apply to [the 
heirs]." See id. The heirs' claims are necessarily based on a duty of reasonable care that 
Dr. Rosenthal owed to Mr. Baker and any claim by the heirs, therefore, must be subject to 
defenses available against Mr. Baker arising out of his relationship with Dr. Rosenthal, 
including the Arbitration Agreement. 
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The other cases that Appellees attempt to distinguish are likewise applicable here. 
See Jefferson County School Dist. No. R-l v. Shorey, 826 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1992) 
(employee of school district bound by collective bargaining agreement between 
association of which she was a member and the school district; same reasoning applies 
here as in Parker); Everett v. Dickingson & Co., 929 P.2d 10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (a 
person not an intended beneficiary could not benefit from relationship and agreement; 
here, the heirs are expressly intended beneficiaries of the Arbitration Agreement and 
attending physician-patient relationship); Eychner v. Van Vleet, 870 P.2d 486 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1993) (customer's claims against a broker unrelated to the broker's employer's 
contract with the customer were not required to be arbitrated according the contract; same 
reasoning applies here as in Everett). 
UTLA asserts that due to the independent nature of wrongful death claims, a 
decedent "could not file a wrongful death claim on his own behalf, and could not control 
whether a claim was ever filed at all or for whose benefit such a claim might be filed . . . 
[and] could not determine whether, when, and how such a claim might be prosecuted . . . 
." UTLA Brief at 11. Utah law does not support UTLA's argument. As has been 
demonstrated in Jensen, Kelson, and Van Wagoner, a decedent can control whether his 
heirs can file a claim because "the injured individual is not merely a conduit for the 
support of others, he is master of his own claim and he may settle the case or win or lose a 
judgment on his own injury even though others may depend on him." Jensen, at 332 
(quoting W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 
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955 (5th ed. 1984)). Indeed, if before a decedent dies he wins, loses, or settles his claim, 
there is no claim for the heirs to pursue. Likewise, Mr. Baker was free to establish the 
forum for any claims he or his heirs may make arising out of the physician-patient 
relationship between Mr. Baker and Dr. Rosenthal. 
Finally, UTLA argues that the history of the creation of the statutory wrongful 
death claim is instructive because the "pre-statute state of the law created 'anomalous]' 
and unfair results, 'putting the defendant in a better position than if the plaintiff lived.'" 
UTLA Brief at 12 (quoting Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384 P.2d 389, 292 (Utah 1963)). If 
UTLA's position is accepted and arbitration is denied to Dr. Rosenthal, then the tables 
would then be turned and the law would create an anomalous and unfair result by putting 
the heirs of a deceased in a better position than the deceased had he lived to bring a 
lawsuit in his own right. It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature did not intend to 
perpetuate unfair results in the law and nothing in the statutes, Utah Constitution, or any 
case law supports Appellees' and UTLA's position. 
C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THE HEIRS 
AND UTLA ARE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
AND ARE NOT "APPARENT ON THE RECORD" AND MAY NOT 
BE RELIED UPON BY THE COURT TO AFFIRM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION. 
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from 
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the 
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, 
and this is true even though such ground or 
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theory is not urged or argued on appeal by 
appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and 
was not considered or passed on by the lower 
court. 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, TflO, 52 P.3d 1158 (quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 
61, P 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (other citations omitted; 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 714 (1993) 
("Generally, the appellate court may affirm the judgment where it is correct on any legal 
ground or theory disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason, or theory 
adopted by the trial court." (emphasis added)))). This Court has not addressed the 
meaning of the term "apparent on the record," however, the Court of Appeals has found 
as follows: 
Critical to affirmance is the requirement that the ground or 
theory be "apparent on the record." [Limb v. Federated Milk 
Producers Ass % 23 Utah 2d 222, 293 n.2, 461 P.2d 290 
(Utah 1969).] If, in any way, the ground or theory urged 
for the first time on appeal is not apparent on the record, 
the principle of affirming on any proper ground has no 
application. To hold otherwise would invite the prevailing 
party to selectively focus on issues below, the effect of which 
is holding back issues that the opposition had neither notice of 
nor an opportunity to address. Because of this due process 
component, "apparent on the record," in this context, means 
more than mere assumption or absence of evidence contrary 
to the "new" ground or theory. The record must contain 
sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground 
or theory to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice 
that the prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal. 
State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). Thus, as 
with other issues, constitutional issues "may not generally be raised for the first time on 
appeal," Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, ^[11, 89 P.3d 
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171 (declining to address arguments based on article I, sections 7 and 11 of the Utah 
Constitution), and the trial court's ruling may not be affirmed on any ground not 
"apparent on the record," Bailey, 2002 UT at 1J10. 
Here, a thorough review of the record on appeal reveals no mention, discussion, or 
any apparent reference on the record by any party or the trial court to the constitutional 
arguments now raised for the first time by the heirs and UTLA. See Appellee Brief at 23-
24; UTLA Brief at 28-38. Specifically, the Appellees assert arguments based on Utah 
Constitution Article I, § 11 (open courts), Article XVI, § 5 (wrongful death), and the right 
to a trial by jury. UTLA raises several arguments, including the unconstitutionality of the 
Utah Arbitration Act and Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah Constitution Article I, 
§§7 (due process), 10 (trial by jury), 11 (open courts), and 22 (private property for public 
use) and Article XVI, § 5 (wrongful death). None of these arguments are apparent on the 
record below and may not now be relied upon to affirm the trial court's decision. 
Furthermore, the well-settled rule in Utah is that an amicus brief "cannot extend or 
enlarge the issues" presented by the litigants. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 n. 3 
(Utah 1983) (refusing to consider portions of amicus brief that concerned issues not 
pursued by the parties); see also Dean v. Henroid, 1999 UT App 50,1f 7, 975 P.2d 946 
(same). 
Here, the bulk of the constitutional arguments raised in the amicus brief filed by 
UTLA have not been raised by any of the parties in this matter either with the trial court 
or on appeal. Because the constitutional issues raised in UTLA's amicus brief were 
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neither properly preserved for appeal nor argued by the litigants on appeal, the Court 
should not address those issues. 
a THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IS NOT IMPLICATED. 
Even if the constitutional arguments raised by UTLA had been properly preserved 
for appeal, those arguments fail on their merits. As a preliminary matter, it should be 
pointed out that the constitutionality of enforcing the arbitration agreement is separate and 
apart from the issue of whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable against 
Appellees. The arbitration agreement is a contract between private parties. This Court 
has recognized that the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is governed by "the 
standards applicable to all contracts." Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996); see 
also Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,f33, 44 P.3d 663 (stating that a court may 
compel arbitration of matters covered by an arbitration agreement and that the arbitration 
agreement itself "defines the scope of the controversy to be arbitrated"); Allen v. 
Pacheco, 71 P.2d 375, 378 (Colo. 2003) (following principles governing contract 
formation to determine whether dispute must be arbitrated). 
No state action was involved in the drafting or signing of arbitration agreement, so 
the Utah Constitution does not govern the issue of whether the arbitration agreement 
applies to Appellees. See, e.g., Retherfordv. AT &T Communications of Mountain States, 
Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 964 (Utah 1992) (stating that the open courts clause of article I, 
section 11 of the Utah Constitution "restricts the extent to which the state can limit 
common law remedies"); Coleman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 
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1990) (stating that compensation under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is 
required only when the governmental action raises to the level of a taking or damage to 
private property); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that when "state 
action impinge on fundamental rights, due process requires standards" to define the scope 
of permissible actions); Worrallv. Ogden City Fire Dept, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980) 
(Hall, J., dissenting) (stating that article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution requires due 
process when life, liberty or property are placed in jeopardy by state action). Because the 
Arbitration Agreement applies to Appellees under principles of contract law, the only 
remaining issue is whether arbitration itself is constitutional. 
E. ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 7 AND 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
DO NOT PRECLUDE ARBITRATION IN THIS CASE. 
UTLA challenges arbitration in this case under several constitutional provisions. 
UTLA first argues that compelling Appellees to arbitrate their wrongful death claim 
would deny their right to a "day in court" under both the open courts clause of article 1, 
section 11 and the due process clause of article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. See 
UTLA Brief at 30. UTLA further argues that arbitration would constitute a 
unconstitutional taking of property without due process. See UTLA Brief at 36. 
This Court has previously held that a statute enforcing an otherwise valid 
arbitration agreement does not violate either the open courts clause or the due process 
clause of the Utah Constitution. See Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 
1070, 1074-75 (Utahl981). A brief review of the scope of protection afforded under the 
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open courts clause and the due process clause demonstrates why this Court's decision in 
Lindon City is dispositive in the present case. 
i. Open Courts Clause. 
The analysis set forth in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 
1985) governs a review of the constitutionality of a statute under the open courts clause. 
See Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, f 46, 57 P.3d 1007. While UTLA argues that 
the open courts clause requires that a party have an opportunity to litigate a cause of 
action in a judicial tribunal, this Court has held otherwise. In Berry, this Court stated that 
the open courts clause permits "nonjudicial type remedies in lieu of judicial remedies as 
long as other constitutional provisions are not violated and the remedy is reasonable and 
equitable." 717 P.2d at 675 n. 1. 
This Court has recognized that the open courts clause is not primarily concerned 
with the preservation of particular causes of action but rather the availability of legal 
remedies for vindicating an alleged wrong. Id. at 677 n. 4. Accordingly, the open courts 
clause is satisfied "if the law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy" for vindicating an alleged wrong. Id. at 680. The open courts clause 
is satisfied in this case because Appellees may pursue their legal claims against the 
defendants in arbitration. While the heirs may prefer litigation over arbitration, no 
assertion is made that arbitration would provide an unreasonable alternative remedy in 
this case. Accordingly, the open court's clause does not preclude arbitration. 
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One of the cases cited by UTLA is easily distinguishable because it involved a 
party who was left with no alternative remedy. See Miller v. USAA Cas, Ins, Co,, 2002 
UT 6, <f 43, 44 P.3d 663 (concluding that trial court improperly dismissed extra-
contractual claims that were not covered under the appraisal clause of an insurance 
contract). The remaining cases cited by UTLA are distinguishable on other grounds. 
Specifically, Cade v, Zions First National Bank, 956 P.2d 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
involved a discussion regarding the coverage of an arbitration agreement and whether the 
parties intended the agreement to govern their dispute. Id, at 1077-1080. The court in that 
case did not address any constitutional issues. Like Cade, this case involves matters of 
contract construction. An analysis of constitutional issues is not necessary to determine 
whether or not the arbitration agreement applies to the heirs and should be enforced. 
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998) involved an insurance contract that 
limited the insurer's right to settle claims against the insured to amounts within the 
policy's coverage. Id, at 797. Because the insurance contract did not allow the insurer to 
settle claims in excess of the policy limits, this Court held that the insured could not be 
bound by the insurer's agent's agreement to arbitrate those claims. Id, at 799. 
Significantly, the insured in Jenkins was bound by the insurer's agent's agreement to 
arbitrate claims that were within the scope of the insurance contract and policy limits. 
See id, Jenkins does not preclude arbitration in this case because the Arbitration 
Agreement unequivocally provides that the heirs' wrongful death claim against the 
defendants shall be arbitrated. 
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Finally, in the case of Bracken v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 251 P. 16, 19-20 (1926), 
there was no contract between the parties for arbitration or any other reasonable 
alternative to litigation. See id Here, a valid contract for arbitration exists and should be 
enforced. The open courts provision of the Utah Constitution does not preclude 
enforcement of that agreement. 
ii. Due Process Clause. 
"The analysis to determine whether [the heirs] [was] denied [her] day in court is 
the same under both the open courts provision and the due process clause." Miller, 2002 
UT 6 at Tf 38. As with the open courts provision, due process does not equate to judicial 
action. See Lindon City, 636 P.2d at 1074-75; Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 
P.2d314, 316(1945). To the contrary, 
The purposes of the law, especially as to property, may be 
effected by executive or administrative action, and still be 
valid if they meet the requirements of due process. The 
requirements are that no party can be affected by such action, 
until his legal rights have been subject to an inquiry by a 
person or body authorized by law to determine such rights, of 
which inquiry the party has due notice, and at which he had an 
opportunity to be heard and to give evidence as to his rights or 
defenses. 
Lindon City, 636 P.2d at 1074-75 (emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted). 
While Appellees may prefer litigation to arbitration, no allegation is made that arbitration 
would deprive them of any due process rights. Moreover, this Court has determined that 
the procedures and protections afforded by the Utah Arbitration Act "more than fulfill[]" 
all due process requirements. Id. at 1075. Because arbitration would not deprive the 
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heirs of any due process protections, the otherwise valid and enforceable Arbitration 
Agreement does not violate article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
F. ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION DOES 
NOT PRECLUDE ARBITRATION IN THIS CASE. 
UTLA next argues that arbitration would violate article XVI, section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. That constitutional provision precludes "the abolition of the right of action 
for a wrongful death." Berry, 111 P.2d at 684. In Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 
57 P.3d 1007, this Court stated that article XVI, section 5 prohibits the "complete 
abrogation of the right to recover" for wrongful death. Id. at f^ 34 n. 9. The right to 
recover for wrongful death is not, however, the same as the right to bring suit in court. 
In Berry, this Court quoted with approval an Oklahoma case, Roberts v. Merrill, 
386 P.2d 780 (Okla. 1963), in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted a 
constitutional provision that is almost identical to Utah's wrongful death provision. See 
Berry, 111 P.2d at 684. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the "right of action" 
referred to in the constitutional provision is "far from synonymous" with a "cause of 
action." Roberts, 386 P.2d at 785-86; see also Berry, 111 P.2d at 684. The court defined 
a right of action as "the right to effectively pursue an available remedy in a suitable forum 
whether successful or not." Roberts, 386 P.2d at 786; see also Berry, 111 P.2d at 684. In 
Roberts, the court recognized that the Worker's Compensation tribunal was a "more 
suitable" forum for pursuing a wrongful death claim that arose from a fatal injury 
suffered by a worker. 386 P.2d at 786. 
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Here, arbitration has been selected as an alternative forum for resolving Appellees' 
wrongful death claim. While the heirs may prefer to pursue their claim in court, there is 
no allegation that they cannot effectively pursue their wrongful death claim in arbitration. 
UTLA cites Berry in support of its argument that a valid arbitration agreement cannot 
defeat Appellees' right to litigate their claim in court. See UTLA Brief at 34-35. Berry is 
inapposite. In that case, this Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute of repose 
that completely barred the pursuit of the plaintiffs' wrongful death claim. See Berry, 111 
P.2d at 671-72. Unlike the situation in the present case, the plaintiffs in Berry had no 
reasonable alternative forum in which to pursue their claim. Because arbitration provides 
Appellees with a suitable alternative forum for pursing their claim, enforcement of the 
Arbitration Agreement would not violate article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
G- ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION DOES 
NOT PRECLUDE ARBITRATION IN THIS CASE. 
UTLA also asserts that arbitration would constitute an unconstitutional taking 
under article 1, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. See UTLA Brief at 36. The takings 
clause of the Utah Constitution does not apply in this case for at least two reasons. First, 
the takings clause only applies to governmental actions. See Coleman v. Utah State Land 
Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 1990) ("Only when governmental action rises to the level of 
a taking or damage under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay compensation."). 
No governmental action was involved in the drafting or signing of the arbitration 
agreement in this case. Rather, the agreement was entered into by private parties. The 
terms of the arbitration agreement itself, and not any governmental action, foreclose the 
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heirs' right to bring suit in court. Second, the takings clause applies only when private 
property is taken for a public use. See Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 
(Utah 1995). Even if a governmental action had precluded the heirs from pursuing their 
claim in court, the takings clause would still not apply because that right was not taken for 
public use. 
H. ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION DOES 
NOT PRECLUDE ARBITRATION IN THIS CASE. 
UTLA finally argues that arbitration would deprive the heirs of their 
constitutionally protected right to a jury trial. See UTLA Brief at 37. Article I, section 10 
of the Utah Constitution and the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution 
establish the minimum right to a jury trial. See Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 
66,1f 13, 44 P.3d 835. Because Utah's appellate courts have not yet addressed this issue, 
decisions interpreting the federal jury trial right are instructive. Cf. Terra Utilities, Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm % 575 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1978) (stating that the decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court are highly persuasive as to the interpretation of similar provisions of 
the Utah Constitution). 
In holding that enforcement of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement does not 
violate the right to a jury trial, several federal courts have recognized that the right to a 
jury trial attaches only after it is determined that the dispute properly belongs in court. 
See, e.g., Cooper v. MRMInv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2004); Snydor v. Conseco 
Fin. Serv. Corp., 252 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2001); Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. 
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Supp. 2d 819, 834 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Marsh v. First U.S.A. Bank N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 
909, 922 (N.D. Tex. 2000). The court in Marsh concluded that the Seventh Amendment 
does not confer the right to a trial, but only the right to have a 
jury hear the case once it is determined that the litigation 
should proceed before a court. If the claims are properly 
before an arbitral forum pursuant to an arbitration agreement, 
the jury trial right vanishes. 
Id. (quotations and citation omitted); accord Cooper, 367 F.3d at 506; Coates, 125 F. 
Supp. 2d at 834. The court in Marsh further concluded that a "valid arbitration provision 
which waives the right to resolve a dispute through litigation in a judicial forum, 
implicitly waives the attendant right to a jury trial." 103 F. Supp. 2d at 922. The Fourth 
Circuit similarly concluded that "the loss of the right to a jury trial is a necessary and 
fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to arbitrate." Snydor, 252 F.3d at 307 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
Because the arbitration agreement in this case is valid and enforceable against the 
heirs, their claim against the defendants does not belong in court. Absent a dispute that is 
properly before the court, the heirs do not have a right to a jury trial. Accordingly, 
UTLA's resort to article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution is without merit. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Dr. Rosenthal respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the district court's order refusing to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration 
and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with the Arbitration 
Agreement. 
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